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A two-country op[imizing model with capital accumulation, purchasing power parity, floating
exchange rates, uncovered interest parity, perfect foresight, finite lives and population growth
is analysed. For the case of a zero birth rate, individuals are indiHercnt between tax finance
and bond finance or money finance, so that Ricardian debt-neutrality and super-neutrality
prcvail. In general, a tax-financed increase in monetary growth leads to an interdependent
Mundell-Tobin eRect; that is, the world real interest rate falls and capital accumulation
increases. A home monetary expansion leads in the long run to an increase in home
consumption and net foreign assets. If the expansion occurs through open-market operations,
money is super-neutral. Numerical methods are used to calculate the short-run and interim
multialiers and to discuss the eflects of imperfect substitution between home and foreign
goods.
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that, in ad huc macroeconomic IS-LM-AS models with
capital accumulation, an increase in monetary growth leads to a smaller
increase in the nominal interest rate and thus reduces the real interest rate
and increases capital and output in the long run (Tobin, 1965). The main
reason that money is not super-neutral is that money, in contrast to bonds,
does not yield interest. However, the existence of such a Mundell-Tobin eHect
does not arise in slandard optimizing models with infinitely lived consumers,
as then the long-run real interest rate has to match the subjective rate of time
preference (Sidrauski, 1967). Obviously, non-neutralities can occur during the
transient path towards long-run equilibrium (Fischer, 1979a; Asako, 1983).
Long-run non-neutralities occur when money enters the production function
(Dornbusch and Frenkel, 1973; Fischer, 1974), when leisure enters the utility
function in a non-separable fashion (Brock, 1974), when the residual mode
of government finance is distortionary taxes, when there is population growth
(Weil, 1989b), or when lives are finite (van der Ploeg and Marini, 1988). This
paper focuses on the last two sources of non-neutrality, which stress the
disconnectedness of individuals and provide a micro foundation of the Mun-
dell-Tobin etiect. It is assumed that there is a positive birth rate and no
intergenerational beyuest motive. This means that taxes can be passed on to
future (yet unborn) generations, so that debt-neutrality (Barro, 1974) and
super-neutrality (Sidrauski, 1967) no longer hold. Similar Mundell-Tobin
etiects have been found in conventional overlapping-generations models of a
closed economy (e.g. Weiss, 1980; Drazen, 1981).
So far, the discussion of the eHects of monetary growth on the real interest
rate and capital accumulation has been concerned with closed economies. In
small open economies the real ínterest rate is pegged to the world real interest
rate and therefore there is no Mundell-Tobin eftect. However, the world
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consists of interdependent economies and therefore a global Mundell-Tobin
eHect may be relevant. In an interdependent ad hoc IS-LM-AS world with
floating exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, an increase in home
monetary growth and inflation increases the home nominal interest rate,
reduces the world real interest rate, and increases capital, output and employ-
ment both at home and abroad (van der Ploeg, 1990).' The objective of this
paper is to reconsider these issues within the context of a two-country model
with micro foundations, death and population growth. The advantage of such
an approach is that careful account is taken of the intertemporal budget
constraints of governments and private-sector agents and that a more satisfac-
tory welfare analysis is feasible. The main findings are that Ricardian debt-
neutrality and Sidrauski super-neutrality are intricately linked and that a
tax-financed increase in monetary growth within the context of a macro-
economic model with micro foundations leads to a fall in capital accumulation
throughout the world (the interdependent Mundell-Tobin efiect). Some
numerical simulation results are provided, which suggest that the magnitude
of these etíects is substantial.
This paper is not concerned with the eftectiveness and spillover eftects of
fiscal policy in two-country overlapping-generations models. Frenkel and Razin
(1986) discuss fiscal policy within the context of a global version of Blanchard's
model of finite lives with a fixed labour force and fixed supplies of traded and
non-traded goods while Giovannini (1988), Buiter (1986), van der Ploeg
(1988b) and Obstfeld (1989) extend the two-country model to allow for capital
accumulation. A related líterature uses Buiter's (1981) two-country extension
of Diamond's (1965) overlapping-generations model to analyse the welfare
eHects on the current old, domestic unborn, foreign unborn and current foreign
young generations of debt policies-for example Persson (1985), who uses a
single-good model and thus abstracts from the eHects of aggregate demand
on interest rates, and Fried and Howitt (1988), who use a similar model with
a fixed supply of capital. Although there is already an extensive literature on
the eHects of fiscal policies in two-country overlapping models,2 there has
been no analysis of the eHects of monetary policy in such two-country models
so that the main objective of this paper is to provide such an analysis.
Section I develops a two-country model with floating exchange rates,
uncovered interest parity and perfect foresight. Individuals have uncertain
lifetimes and there is population growth. The asset menu consists of home
equity, home money, and home and foreign government bonds. Section 11
considers the special case of a zero birth rate, which occurs when agents have
infinite lives and there is no population growth. For this case any increase in
non-human wealth arising from an increase in government debt is exactly
otiset by a reduction in human wealth arising from the future taxes required
to pay oft the additional government debt; hence Ricardian debt-neutrality
prevails. Similarly, individuals are índifterent between money finance and tax
finance and therefore Sidrauski super-neutralíty holds. The Appendix decom-
poses the general two-country model into globat averages and global difteren-
ces, which simplifies the analysis considerably.
Section III considers joint and unilateral increases in monetary growth.
When the residual mode of government finance is lump-sum taxation, one has
an interdependent Mundell-Tobin eftect. However, when the increase in
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monetary growth occurs through open-market operations, money is super-
neutral. The long-run eHects of a home tax-financed increase in monetary
growth are a fall in the world real in[erest rate, an increase in global activity,
an increase in home consumption, a fall ín foreign comsumption, an increase
in home holdings of foreign assets, and a home balance-of-trade deficit. Section
1V generalizes the model to allow for imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods and uses numerical simulation to compare the results with
those under purchasing power parity ( PPP) and to shed more light on transient
eftects. Section V concludes the paper.
I. A TWO-COUNTRY ~VERLAPPING-GENERATIONS MODEL WITH CAPITAL,
MONEY ANt) GOVERNMENT DEBT
( a) ~iaremen~ uj rhe model
The world consists of two countries which are of equal size. The two countries
have identical preferences, technologies and demographic structures, so that
the only reasons for international trade in goods and financial assets are due
to ditIerences in fiscal or monetary policies. There is no currency substitution,
so that money corresponds to a non-traded good. There are global markets
for government bonds and equity on which there is risk-neutral arbitrage. lt
follows that capital, output and investment are the same in both countries.
Labour is immobile and is thus a non-traded good. There is full employment
in each country. There is a global market for goods, so that purchasing power
parity holds, and there is a regime of floating exchange rates. There are
overlapping generations, and there is no intergenerational bequest motive.
Utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of the consumption of goods and real
money balances, while labour supply is inelastic. Foreign variables are denoted










where per capita state-space variables are the capital stock ( K), net Ibreign
assrts (F), comprehensive consumption on home goods, foreign goods and
rcal money balances ( U), real money balances ( M) and real government debt
( D); the exogenous policy instruments are the rate of growth of the aggregate
money supply (B), the level of government spending (G) and the level of
lump-sum taxation ( ~„); the exogenous parameters are the rate of time prefer-
ence ( a), the probability of death (p) , the rate of population growth (n), the
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share of the opportunity cost ofholding real money balances ín comprehensive
spending ( y) and the responsiveness of taxes to the government deficit (~,);
and f( K) denotes the intensive-form production function net of depreciation.
The capital stock, net foreign asse[s and government debt at home and
abroad are predetermined, whereas comprehensive consumption and the price
level (and thus M) at home and abroad are unconstraíned by their past history.
A perfect-foresight equilibrium assumes that all agen[s are on their demand
and supply curves and that their expectations of future outcomes are rational,
and satisfies all intertemporal accounting identities. It follows that the state-
space variables depend on past values and on current and past expectatic ns
of current and future values taken on by the policy instruments. The solutio:
of the model is discussed in the Appendix.
The real interest rate and the wage rate are given by r - f( K) and w-
f( K)- Kf ( K). Aggregate per capita production and gross investment are
Y-f(K)tê(K) and 1- Y-2y(Ut U')-2(GtG'), where S denotes the
rate of depreciation. Consumption of goods is given by C- yU lnflation is
given by p -(1 - y)( U~ M)- f ( K). Non-hurnan wealth and human wealth
are given by A~ K t M~- D f F and H- U(a f Q)-' - A. Readers can move
straight to Section I1, but it is probably helpful to go through the detailed
derivation of the model that is given in the remainder of this section.
(b) Finite lives and the indiuidual's demand jor goods and money balanees
The dcmand side of each economy is made up of identical consumers with
constant life expectancy. There is no intergenerational bequest motive, as in
the analysis of Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989a). The supply of labour at
time t of a consumer born at time s s t, I(s, r), is inelastic, say I(s, t) - 1. In
general, lower-case letters denote the individual counterparts to the per capita
popula[ion aggregates; for example, c(s, t) denotes consumption at time t of
a consumer born at time s s t. The consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences
over the consumption of private goods, real money balances and the consump-
tion of public goods. Feenstra (1986) provides a justification, based on liquidity
costs, for entering money in the utility function. The consumer faces the
following optimization problem:
(9) max J mlog{[c(s, u)Ym(s, u)'-']g(u)Y~}
m xlexp[(af~3)(t-v)]du, O~y~1,
subject to the individual consumer's flow budget constraint,
da(s, t)(lo) dt -[r(t)f~3]a(s, t)t w(t)I(s, t)-z(s, t)-c(s, t)
-[r(t)fp(t)]m(s, t).
and the condition precluding Ponzí games,
( ~ l
(Ill lim exp j - [r(f..)t~]dN J a(v, r)-0,~~-~- l ,
where z(s, t) denotes lump-sum taxation at time t of a consumer born at time
s. The individual consumer receives (pays), for every period of his life, a
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premium ~3a(s, t), and at the time of death the individual's net wealth (debt)
goes to (is cancelled by) the life insurance company. The premium is actuarially
fair, so that this formulation corresponds to efficient life insurance or annuities
markets. Since the probability of death and the premium are equal to (3, the
subjective rate of time preference and the real rate of return are efiectively
increased by this amount.
Comprehensive spending is defined as consumption of goods plus interest
forgone on money holdings; that is,
(12) u(s,t)~c(s,t)t[r(t)tp(t)]m(s,t).
The optimization then yields c(s, t)-yu(s,t), m(s,t)-(1-y)u(s, t)~[r(r)t
p(t)] and the 'tilt' of the comprehensive consumption function,
du(s, t)~dt -[r(r)-~]u(s, t).
Nute that the individual consumer ensures that the marginal rate of substitution
brtween goods and real muney balances equals the opportunity cost of holding
real money balances, i.e. the nominal interest rate, and that the semi-elasticity
of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate is unity. If one
definrs human weal[h as the presen[ discounted value of expected after-tax
wage income,
(13) h(s,t)á J~[w(u)I(s,u)-z(s,u)]exP{- JV[r(l4)tR]d~ydu,
where the discount rate equals the real interest rate plus the proJbability of
death, one can write comprehensive spending as
(14) u(s,t)-(at(j)[a(s,t)th(s,t)].
Tlie consumption function is linear in human plus non-human wealth, because
Ihr intertemporal elasticily of subslitution is assumed to be uni[y. This assump-
tion facilitates the aggregation acruss individuals born at the same instant.
131anchard (1985) discusses the implications of general isoelastic u[ility fune-
tiuns for non-monetary economies.
(c') Aggregalion arruss i~~d~tvduals and popularion gruN~rh
Buiter ( 1988 ) extends the aggregation procedure of Yaari ( 1965) and Blanchard
( 19t;5) to alluw for population growth and extends the aggregation procedure
uf Weil ( 1989a) to allow for finite lives. This extension allows for overlapping
I~amilies of finitely lived individuals and is applied here.
At each instant a new cohort is born. The size of each cohort grows at a
cunstant rate, so that the size of [he cohort born at time r eyuals ( n t p) exp ( nr ).
The size at time r of the surviving cohort born at time s s t equals
(nt(3) exp ( ns) exp [-(3(r - s)], since ~3 is the probability of death. The total
pupulation at time r eyuals (n t ~3) J' y exp (ns) exp [-f3(r - s)] ds - exp (nr).
The per capita population aggregate for, say, consumption ís defined as
(IS) C(r)-(nt~) JI c(s,t)exp[(nf~i)(s-t)]ds,
~
because the population aggregate is obtained as the sum of consumption of
all surviving cohorts at time t, c(s, r), s s!, tímes the size of the surviving
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cohon, (n f~3) exp (ns) exp [-~i(! - s)] and the per capita population aggre-
gate is obtained by dividing the population aggregate by the population size,
exp (nr). Other per capila population aggregates are obtained in a similar
manner and are denoted by capital letters.





The derivation of (19) used the fact that, in the absence of bequests, the
non-human wealth of newly born individuals must be zero: a(r, r) -0. Unlike
(IO), (19) no longer con[ains a lífe insurance premium as this e(Iectively
constilutes a transfer from those who die to those who survive and therefore
does not aHect the return on aggregate non-human wealth. Aggregation of
human wealth, (13), yields li-(r-4.~3)H-wtZ. Upon substitution of ttiis
and the aggregate consumption function, U-(atp)(At N), into (l9), one
obtains the 'tilt' of the aggregate comprehensive consumption function, (18).
( d ) Producrion
Tfte production side of each economy follows from a concave and
twice diHerentiable constant-returns-to-scale production function, y(r)-
f(k(r), 1(r)) where 1(r) denotes employment at time r. The value of the firm,
v, follows from the condition for risk-neutral arbitrage between equity and
other financial assets; that is, ru - r;` f (y - wl - i). Hence shareholders equate
the return on equity, i.e. capital gains plus dividends, to the real return on
alternative assets. Integration of this arbitrage condition gives an expression
for the value of the firm,
(20) v(r)- J m[f(k(u),1(v))-w(v)1(v)-i(u)]exp L - J ~ r(rc)dtr~du,,
which simpty represents the present discounted value of future profits.
htaximization of the value of the firm subject to the capital accumulation
condition, k - i- Sk, yields j~,( k, 1) - w and J,,(k, !) - r f S. In other words, the
margínal product of labour equals the real wage and the marginal product of
capital equals the user cost of capital, i.e. the rental charge plus depreciation
charge minus capital gains. There are no adjustment costs associated with
investrnent, so that Tobin's ' Q' is unity and therefore v- k. Labour market
equilibrium gives 1(r) - exp (nr). ln percapira units, one has f(K )- r, f(K)-
Kf(K)-w and 1C-1-(Stn)K, K(0)-Ko, where K(r)-k(r)exp(-nr),
I(r) ~ i( t) exp (- nr) and net per capita outpu[ is given by j( K) á f( K, 1) - SK.
The excess of net output over wages plus dividends, rr g j( K, !1- w-1,
must equal the capital gains on equity, that is f( K)- a- w- V` f n V. Since
j( K)- rK t w, one has the arbitrage condition ~r f V` -(r- n) V.
(e) Financial assets and rhe governmenr budger conslrainr
Thr asset menu of consumers consists of home cash, home government bonds,
foreign government bonds and home (and Coreign) equity. Since home equity,
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home government bonds and foreign government bonds are perfect substitutes,
the results also hold for the case when there is international trade in equities.
Hence there is no currency substitution and money can be treated as a
non-traded good. Home and foreign government bonds are perfect substitutes,
so that non-human wealth corresponds to A~ M t B t V where B denotes
the per capita holdings of home and foreign government bonds by home
individuals. The government spends on goods, levies lump-sum taxes and
finances the deficit by printing money or issuing government debt. This is
captured by the government budget constraint,
(21) D-(r-n)~-G-Z-BM, D(0)-D,,,
where G(r)-g(t) exp(-nr) denotes per capira government spending at time
r. Seigniorage revenues are represented by the term BM. lntegration of (21)
and application of the solvency (no-Ponzi-games) condition yields
(2l') D(1)-J~[Z(u)tB(o)M(o)-G(o)]expi-Ju[r(fc)-n]df~.Jdv,
so that the current real government debt has to ble paid oB by the plresent
discounted value of the excess of future lump-sum taxes and seigniorage
revenues over government spending.
Equilibrium in the money market is represented by'
(22) IN-(fl-p-n)M, M(U)-free.
Since the economies are classical without any rigidities, the price level clears
the goods markets and depends on expectrd future events. This implies that
the initial price level and the initial per capita holdings of real money balances,
M(U), are free to jump.
Each government has four policy instruments-G, Z, 9 and D-of which
three can be chosen freely and the fourth follows residually from the govern-
ment budge[ constraint. Under bond finance it is assumed that G and B are
exogenous policy instruments, Z is an endogenous policy instrument and
fullows from a feedback rule, and D follows from the government budgrt
constrain[. A feedback rule for lump-sum taxalion is required, because in the
absence ofsuch a rule the solvency of the governmen: is nol ensured. A sensible
t;~x rule is
f~~) Z-~o-l;iDt~,U,
su that taxes are raised when the rral government drbt is high or whrn therr
is a government surplus. Solvency usually requires
dD~dD-lr-n-l:z)~ll -rj,)CU.
w that either ~, ~ r- n and ~, - U or ~, - U and f, ~ 1 is assumed. Nute that,
fur ~,-U, a long-run increase in taxation, ~,,, is pl~ceded by u short-run cut
in c~xatiun, Z -{-~„ t!:,[(r- n)D t G- Bhf ])~(f, - I). Obviously, an increase
in guvernment sprnding or fall in seigniorage revenues requires an increase
in taxation. The case of tax tinance ( D- 0) corresponds to ~, y oo, so that
Z -(r- n)D„ t G- BM. From now on, it will be assumed that the tax rule is
givrn by Z-~„-~,D ( i.e. ~,-U). Note that only the aggregate level of
lump-sum tazes matters for the aggregate per capita variables, so that the
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distribution of taxes across generations does not affect aggregate per capita
variables.
(J) The inlernariona! conrex!
The foreign country has analogous relationships to the ones discussed in
Sections ( b)-(e} above. There is no labour mobitity between the two countries
and there is no international market for equity. However, there are elTicient
international markets for goods and government bonds. In fact, it is assumed
tha[ there is perfect substitution between home and foreign products as well
as between home and foreign government bonds. Hence ( relative) purchasing
power parity, p(r)-p'(r)te(r) (where e(t) denotes the rate of depreciation
oi the nominal exchange rate at time r), and uncovered interest parity, r(t)f
p(r)- r'(r)tp'(r)te'(r) (where e`(r) denotes the expected rate of depreci-
ation of the nominal exchange rale at time r), must hold. Together wíth the
assumption of perfect foresight, one has equalization of real interest rates,
r( t)- r'( r). It follows from f( K)- f( K') - r that the home and foreign
capital stocks must also be the same, i.e. K- K', and that therefore wage
rates must be the same, w- w`.
The Law of One Price implies that there is a world market for goods for
which the equilibrium condition is
(24) YtY'-CfC'tl-~1'fGfG',
wherc Y- j( K, 1) denotes per capita gross output. Net holdings of foreign
assets are the excess of private-sector holdings of bonds over government debt,
that is F á B- D. The condition for equilibrium in the world market for
government bonds is B t B' - D fD' or F' - -F. The balance of trade is the
excess of domestic production over domestic absorption, Y- C- I- G.
Together with interest on net foreign assets, it gives the current account,
(25) F-(r-n)FtY-C-I-G, F(0)-F~,
which equals the increase in wealth of the nation. Note that subtraction of
K-1-(ófn)K, (2t) and ( 22) from (19) yields (25). Application of the
country's solvency (no-Ponzi-games) condition gives
(25') F'(t)- J~IY(u)-C(u)-I(u)-G(u)]
xexpS- Ju[r(N.)-n]dN.}du,
so that the current deblt of the nation evenJtually has to be paid oH by future
savings' surpluses of the government and private sector (i.e. by fulure balance
of trade surpluses).
II. SUP[R-NEUTRALI'iti' AND DEBT-NEUTRALITY
Since the death rate is ~3 and the population growth rate is n, the birth rate
must equal n -~ ~3. The birth rate is exactly the wedge between the discount
rate used to calculate human wealth, rf~3, and the discount rate used to
calculate government debt, r-n. If the birth rate is zero, this wedge is zero
and therefore it is no longer possible for society to pass taxes on to future
1991] MONEY AND CAPITAL IN INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES 241
generations. This implies that individuals are indifierent between tax finance
and bond finance of the government deficit, because an increase in government
debt has to be paid ofi by future taxes and the discounted value of these taxes
reduces human wealth by exactly the same amoun[ as non-human wealth is
increased. Hence Ricardian debt-neutrality ( cf. Barro, 1974) prevails when the
birth rate is zero.




Clearly, increases in monetary growth ( induced by open-market operatíons)
at home or abroad ( B, 9`) have no etfect on the real interest rate, capital,
output, consumption of goods or investment, and therefore super-neutrality
(cf. Sidrauski, 1967) holds. They increase the inflation and nominal interest
rates one-for-one and thus reduce holdings of real money balances, so that
economic welfare falls. Real seigniorage revenues increase (see equation (32)
below), which permits the servicing of a greater government debt as lump-sum
taxes are unaHected. In fact, the fall in non-human weal[h caused by the fall
in real money balances is exactly ofiset by the increase in non-human wealth
caused by the increase in holdings of bonds, so that to[al wealth and consump-
tion are unatfiected. Super-neutrality of monetary growth also holds when
lump-sum taxes rather than bonds are the residual mode of government finance.
In that case, the fall in non-human wealth is exactly ofiset by the increase in
human wealth caused by the fall in lump-sum taxes.
It is easy to show that, for a zero birth rate, dK (oo)~dG - d K`(oo)~JG - 0,
dC(oo)~dG -dC'(oo)~dG --; and dF(oo)~dG - ;(a - n), su that any
increase in real government spending is completely crowded out by a reduc[ion
in private consumption and therefore has no elTect on the real interest rate,
capital stock or output. The associated trade deficits imply a transient foreign
debt, but in the long run must be associated with net foreign assets ( if n ~ a).
More imponantly, the transient and steady-state eHe~ts of government spend-
ing on capital, output and consumption do not depend on whether it is financed
by money, bonds or taxes. Bond finance today is not perceived as an increase
in private-sector wealth, because the discounted value of the future lump-sum
or inflation taxes required [o pay off the debt exactly equals today's increase
in government deb[. 1[ is also obvious that, when the birth rate is zero, changes
in lump-sum taxation have no real etiects.
Note that the death rate is irrelevant for these neutrality results. For
example, economies with a positive death rate and a zero birth rate ( ~i --n ) Q)
have a declining population and are characterized by super-neutrality and
debt-neu[r~lity as well.
In the light of the above discussion, it may be useful to relate the two-country
mudel prrsented in Section I lo some previous models. If one assumes zero
pupul~tion growth, infinite lives and no government debt (n -)3 - D- I)' - U),
the present model correspunds to e two-country extension uf the money capital,
closed-economy mod~l developed by Sidrauski (1967). In such a world long-
run suprr-neutrality holds; that is, monetary growth is unable to atiect the
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steady-state outcomes of real variables, although (for weakly non-separable
rather than Cobb-Douglas preferences) there may be short-run neutralities
(Fischer, 1979b; Asako, 1983). If one assumes zero population growth, finite
lives and no government debt ( n- D- D' - 0), the present model corresponds
to a two-country extension of the closed-economy model developed by Marini
and van der Ploeg (1988). In that case, an increase in monetary growth with
lump-sum taxes as the residual mode of government finance reduces the real
interest rate, increases capital, increases seigniorage revenues (and therefore
reduces lump-sum taxes by the same amount), increases both human and total
wealth, and increases the consumption of goods. Finite lives clearly destroy
the super-neutrality result. Similarly, an increase in government spending
increases the interest rate, reduces capital, real money balances, human wealth
and non-human wealth, increases lump-sum taxation, reduces seigniorage
revenues, and leads to more than 100 per cent crowding-out ofprivate consump-
tion. If one assumes positive population growth and infinite lives (S - 0), the
present model corresponds to a two-country extension of the closed-economy
model developed by Weil (1989b). Weil finds that population growth alone is
suffcient to destroy the long-run super neutrality of monetary growth. The
reason is, of course, that the government can tax both those individuals
currently alive and those yet to be born. In fact, it has already been argued
above that a necessary and sufficient condition for super-neutrality is that the
total birth rate is zero.
Blanchard (1985) shows, for a closed economy without money but with
capital, that finite lives and the absence of an intergenerational bequest motive
destroy Ricardian debt-neutrality, and Weil (1989a) shows the same for popula-
tion growth. Buiter (1988) shows, for a closed economy without money and
capital, that a necessary and sufficient condition for Ricardian debt-neutrality
is that there is no intergenerational bequest motive and that the total birth
rate, i.e. the sum of the population growth rate and the probability of death,
must be zero. Or course. Barro (1974) also discusses that, without bequests,
models with finitely lived consumers have non-neutrality of government debt.
The contribution of Blanchard (1985), Weil (1989a) and Buiter (1988) is simply
to provide models without bequests that are easier to manipulate than the
Diamond-type overlapping-generations models without bequests.
III. MONETARY POLICY
( u) Sread~~-stale effects oj a joint increase in monetary growth
The case of tax finance is considered first. This means that seigniorage is
rebated to agents in a lump-sum manner through helicopter drops of money.
The relevant steady-state, tax-financed multipliers for multilateral increases in
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so that [dr(oo)~dB"]TF --(n t~i)(a fQ)yMj"~~TFS 0. Hence, as long as the
total birth rate is positive, a joint increase in monetary growth leads in the
long run to a one-for-one increase in inflation, an increase in nominal interest
rates, a fall in the world real interest rate, increases in global capital, output
and consumption of goods, and a fall in real money balances. These multipliers
remind one of the conventional Mundell-Tobin eftect, yet they are derived
from a general equilibrium model with micro foundations. This breakdown
of super-neutrality arises because a positive birth rate drives a wedge between
the discount rate used to calculate human wealth and the one used to calculate
government debt, and therefore drives a wedge between the real interest rate
and the rate of time preference.




hence an increase in global monetary grow[h raíses seigniorage revenues
(drspite a fall in real money balances) and therefore reduces lump-sum taxes.
Human wealth increases, because lump-sum taxes fall and because (with a
positive birth rate) wage income increases and the real interest rate falls. The
increase in human wealth more than oHsets any fall in non-human wealth, so
that total wealth and consumption of goods rises. Obviously, joint increases
in monetary growth have no etiects on net foreign assets.
The increase in the consumption of goods inereases global welfare, while
the increase in inflation and fall in real money balances reduce global welfare,
so that the net eHect on global welfare is ambiguous.
The above micro foundation of the Mundell-Tobin eftect contrasts with
Sidrau~ki's ( 1967) result on super-neutrality. This result holds for tax-financed
increases in monetary growth, but not for bond-financed increases in monetary





It is not surprising that under bond finance changes in monetary growth
du nut atírct rral outcomes in the long run, because lump-sum taxes and
thrrrfore human wealth are unaHected by bond linance in the long run
( Z- f„ -~, L~ -~„). Thercfore it does not matter that the birth rate drives a
wedge brtween thr discount rate used to calculate human wealth and the one
usrd tu calculatr the governmrnt debt, so that real outcomes are unaf{ected
in the long run. The optimal monetary policy is then for each government to
implcment Friedman's ( 1969) full liquidity rule, that is, to drive the nomin~l
interest rates to zero and the holdings of real money balances to infinity by
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setting the monetary growth rates to the difterence between the population
growth rate and the rate of time preferences ( B- B' - n - a). Obviously, when
the tax rule depends on the stock of government debt ( say, Z-~~f ~zD),
monetary growth aftects lump-sum taxation and thus real outcomes in the long
run.
When the total birth rate is zero ( n t Q- 0), the eHects on real money
balances and seigniorage revenues are exactly the same as with tax-financed
monetary growth. Since seigniorage revenues increase, the government can
atiord to service larger stocks of government debt. There are no effects on
total (human plus non-human) wealth. This reflects the Ricardian debt
equivalence proportion (e.g. Barro, 1974), because the increase in human
wealth arising from the reduction in taxes under the tax-financed increase in
monetary growth is exactly the same as the increase in bonds under the
bond-financed increase in monetary growth. Hence, for n t Q- 0, one has
(35) [dBa(~)~dea]eF-[dH"(oo)~de~]TF
- -[dM(~)~dB~] NF.TF - M J U.aft)-n
Also, when the birth rate is zero, the long-run effects on social welfare are
independent of the resídual mode of finance.
Finally, when the birth rate is positive and preferences arc non-separable
in consumption and real money balances, bond-financed monetary growth can
have real efIects in the long run (cf. Marini and van der Ploeg, 1988). The
reason is that monetary growth affects the nominal interest rate, which in turn
aftects the proportion spent on consumption of goods. Bond-financed increases
in monetary growth decrease (increase) capital and consumption when the
elasticity of substitution between goods and real money balances is less
(greater) than unity.
(6) Steady-srate effects oja unilatera! inerease in monerary growth
Again, the case of helicopter drops of subsidies (tax finance) is considered
first. The relevant steady-state, tax-financed multipliers for unilateral increases





The Appendix shows that, as far as steady-state consumption is concerned,
an increase in monetary growth is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy; i.e.
[d U(w)~dB]TF ~ 0, [d U'~dB]TF ~ U. The Appendix also shows that an
increase in monetary growth reduces holdings of real money balances at home
by more than abroad: 0~[dM(oo)~dB]rF-c[dM'(oo)~dB]TF.
For the case of a zero birth rate, global monetary growth is super-neutral
and therefore does not aHect average consumption. !t follows that the positive
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efiect of home monetary growth on home consumption is exactly ofiset by the
negative etíect on foreign consumption
[dC(~)~dBjrF - -[dC'(~)~dejrF ~ 0, n t~ -0.
In general, [he birth rate is positive, unilateral monetary growth is non-neutral,
and therefore the positive etiect on home consumption outweighs the negative
eftect on foreign consumption.
The increase in home monetary growth rate, in general (n t(3 ~ 0), leads
to an equal increase in home inflation ( p - Bj), a ( smaller) increase in the
home nominal interest rate (rtpT) and a fall in the world real interest rate
(r-r'j). This increases capital accumulation and output, both at home and
abroad ( K - K'T, Y- Y'T). This is the two-country version of the Mundell-
Tobin et3ect. Foreign inflation is unatiected. This means that each country has
an incentive to transfer the burden of reducing the world real interest rate and
increasing world activity to the other country, because then it does not need
to increase its own monetary growth and inflation rate while it does enjoy the
increase in activity ( cf. van der Ploeg, 1990).
Since the opportunity cost of holding money balances increases at home
and decreases abroad (r't p'l), it is relatively less attractive for home agents
to hold money than it is for foreign agents. There is, therefore, an incentive
for home agents to buy bonds from foreign agents ( BT, B'1), so th~t the home
(foreign) country accumulates foreign assets (debt) ( Fr). The interest payments
un net foreign assets allows the home country to run a balance of trade deficit,
su that in the long run home agents can aftord to consume tnore than foreign
agems ~C, Uj, C', U'r).
Hence, even though there is a positive spillover etfiect of home monetary
growth on foreign capital and output, there is a negative spillover etficct on
foreign consumption of goods, and this decreases foreign social welfare. The
net eHect on foreign social welfare depends on what happens to foreign
holdings of real money balances. The lower opportunity cost of holding foreign
money balances tends to increase it, while the lower levels of foreign total
consumption and total wealth tend to decrease it, so that the net eHect on
holdings of foreign money balances is ambiguous (11~1'jl). For small ( largr)
values of the birth rate, foreign money balances decline ( increase) and thrrefore
foreign social welfare unambiguously decreases ( might increase).
Seigniorage rrvenues a[ home increase (NMj), which allows the home
govrrnment to cut taxes ( Zl). Human wealth ofhome agents increases, because
th~ wage incrrasrs (N~j) , lump-sum taxes fall and [he real inttrest rate falls.
Non-human wealth of home agrnts can decrease when lhe fall in home rral
mun~y balancrs outwrighs the incre~se in home equity and bondholdings, but
any f:rll must be dominated by the increase in human wealth as total wealth
uf home ~gents incrrases (At Hj). The eHrc[ on forrign seigniorage revenurs
is arnbiguous ( ~` tif' j j), so that the elíect on foreign taxes and human wealth
iti ambiguous. The rtíect on forrign non-human wealth is also ambiguous,
b~cause thr f~ll in forrign bondhuldings may or may not be ou[weighed by
thr in~rcasr in foreign ryuity anJ the pussiblr increase in foreign real money
b~lancrs. tiuwrvrr, total fureign wralth decreases (A'f H'l).
Now consider the case of bond finance ( ~ ~ 0). A unilatrral bond-financed
increase in monetary growth has no rHect on real activity (see equation (33))
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and, similarly, it has no et3ect on net foreign assets in the long run
([dF(oo)~dBJBF - 0). The reason is again that long-run taxation is unaftected.
(r) Dynamic policy simulatian
Table 1 presents the parameter values that have been used in the numerical
simulation exercises presented in Table 2. It has been assumed that the average
lifetime is 50 periods, that, the pure rate of time preference and the rate of
population growth are 2 per cent, that the share of pre-tax labour income in
value added is 80 per cent, that the share of imports in total consumption is
25 per cent, and that increases in the supply of money are distributed through
lump-sum subsidies (tax finance). The model has been linearized around the
symmetric steady state associated with 7 per cent inflation and a level of
government spending and lump-sum taxes equal to, respectively, 20 and ~.9
per cent of the national income. This corresponds to a steady-state per capita
primary deficit, seigniorage revenues and public debt of, respectively, 12.1,
13.5 ~ nd 134.6 per cent of the national income. Steady-state human wealth
corresponds to about 14 times the national income. The eigenvalues ol' the
linearized model are real and satisfy the saddlepoint property. The global
averages take about 35 periods (-In (0.001)~0-1991), whereas the global
ditTerences take about 253 periods to settle down within 0.1 per cent of the
steady-state values. The slow adjustment of the global Jifíerences is due mainly
to the sluggish nature of the current-account dynamics.
Table 2 shows the impact and steady-state efíects of a tax-financed increase
of 10 percentage points in monetary growth at home and abroad. Since it is
a joint increase, there is no etiect on the balance of trade, the current account
or the accumulation of foreign assets. In the long run, the real interest rate
falls by 0.46 percentage points, so that the capital stock increases by 4.45 per
cent and output and the real wage by 0.89 per cent. However, on impact these
variables are unaHected. The inflation rate jumps up on impact by 9.54




tr - li - n- 0.02; ó- 0-1; ~( K, 1) - 0-65 Kv 1; y- 0-08; ~- 0-75;
f-O.U; f„-0~05125; G-G'-0-13; B-b'-0-07
Steady state ( symmetric)
N~ - 0- 52; r- 0.03; p- 0-OS; r t p- 0.08;
C'-0-4; I -0-12; Y-U-6S; J(K)-0-55; V- K- 1-0;
H-9-375; A-3-125; M-1-2S; D-B-0~875; F-O;
HA1 - 0-U87S; G- 9M - 0.0425; Z - 0-05125;
U-0-5; ylog(C)t(I-y)log(M)--0-6884.
Eigcnvalurs: lax finance end purchasing power parity
-0-1991, 0-0838 and 0.2153 for the global avereges;
-0-U273, 0-0418 and 0-0855 for the global difTerences.
Eigrmalues: tax finance and imperfect substitution
-U.1991, U-0838 and 0 2153 for the global averages;
-0-3170, -0-0184, 0-0324, 0-0848 and 0-2153 for the global differences.
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TABLE 2
E.FFECTS OF UNANTICIPATED TAX-FINANCED INCREASE IN MUNETARY
iiROWTH
IOoIo incrcase in
hotne and foreign IOqo increase in home monetary growth
monetary growth
o~o [PPP] Imperfect substitution
change in Impact Final Impact Final Impact Final
U, C, C~ -2-217 0~ I I I -6~703 2.105 -5.061 2.105
U', C', C~ -2-217 0.111 4-486 -1.994 2-844 -1 994
C„ -2.217 0.111 -b-703 2-105 -13.691 8-176
C~, -2-217 U.III 4.486 -1.994 11~464 -8~U6S
v 0.0 0.0 0.0 0~0 8.620 -6.072
b'" 0-0 0~0 3.443 -1.262 2.111 -1.261
I 7-390 4.454 3.695 2-227 -5.434 2.227
I' 7.390 4-454 3.695 2.227 1-956 2-227
K` 0.0 4.454 0~0 2.227 0-0 2 227
K" 0.0 4-454 0.0 2 227 0.0 2.227
M -121-425 -119~098 -126-862 -120000 -124.911 -120.000
Af' -48 S70 -46-214 5-437 0~902 3.4859 0.902
F~A' 0-0 0.0 0-0 26.230 0-0 26~230
A -48-570 -46-214 -50.745 -21.OS8 -49.965 -21.058
A' -4R.S70 -46-214 2-175 -25-IS6 I-395 -2S 156
N 13.234 IS.553 7.978 9.826 9.906 9.826
H' 13~234 IS.S53 5~256 5.727 3.328 5 727
Z -36.591 -40.S6S -27.309 -39.025 -30.639 -39~025
Z' -36.591 -40-565 -9-282 -1.540 -5-952 -1.540
p, p, 9.537 10-0 9-613 10.0 9.588 10-0
r'. r` 9.537 10-0 -0-076 0.0 -0 051 0.0
wrlfare~ -26-059 -3.209 -30 734 -22 316 -29 U31 -22.316
welfare"' -26-OS9 -3-209 4-676 -1-414 2.972 -I.414
' For this variable, the arithmetic change in percentage points is given.
"This variable is the ratio of the balancc of trade to gross outpw, Ihat is ( Y- C- I- G)~ Y.
`The arithmetic changcs in the real interest rate (in percentage points) and percentage change in
output and the real wage are, respectively, -0 104, 0 2 and 0 2 times the percentage changes in
the capital stock.
~ Welfare is defined as C`'A1'-'.
immediately increases the opportunity cost of holding real money balances,
so that real money balances and non-human wealth fall on impact by 121~43
and 48.57 per cent, thereby overshooting their steady state by 2.33 and 2-36
per cent, respectively. 7he increase in seigniorage revenues permits a cut in
taxation of 36.59 per cent, which gradually rises to 40.56 per cent, and an
increase in human wealth of 13.23 per cent, which gradually rises to IS-5S
per cent. The overshooting of real money balances can also be seen in the
behaviour of total wealth and consumption: on impact they fall by 2.22 per
cent, and in the long run they increase by 0.11 per cent. Instantaneous welfare
also overshoots, since on impact it falls by 26.06 per cent and in the long run
by 23-73 per cent.
Table 2 also shows the impact and steady-state eHects of a tax-financed
increase of 10 percentage points in home monetary growth. The eHects on the
real interest rate, investment, capital stock, output and the wage rate and on
the global averages of all other variables are exactly half of what they are
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under a joint increase in monetary growth. In other words, in the long run
thcre is an interdependent Mundell-Tobin ettect, so that a unilateral increase
in monetary growth boosts investment and production a[ home and abroad.
At home the increase in seigniorage revenues permits a shon-run cut in taxation
of 27.31 per cent, which increases human wealth by 7.98 per cent. On impact,
home real money balances and non-human wealth fall by 126~86 and 50-75
per cent, which ensures that home total wealth and consumption fall by 6~70
per cent. Abroad, the anticipation of higher wage rates, lower taxation and
lower interest rates boosts human wealth on impact by 5-26 per cent. Foreign
real money balances and non-human wealth increase by 5.44 and 2.18 per
cent on impact. Hence foreign total wealth and consumption increase by 4-49
per cent on impact. Both at home and abroad, real money balances and total
wealth overshoot their equilibrium values, so that total wealth and consumption
at home and abroad misadjust in the short run. "fhis causes instantaneous
welfare at home to fall by 30.73 per cent on impact and [herefore to overshuot
by 8.42 per cent, and instantaneous welfare abroad to increase by 4.68 per
cent on impact and to fall by 1~41 per cent in the long run.
IV. 1MPERFECT SUBSTITUTION nETW[EN HUME AND FURLIGN GOOUS
So far, the two-country model discussed in this paper incorporated the Law
uf One Price. Here the unrealistic assumption of purchasing power parity is
replaced by the assumption of irnperfect substitutron between home and foreign
goods. It is also assumed that each country is completely specialized in
production. Real variables are deflated by the producers' price level, P This
means that the analysis of Sections 1(b)-(e) is as before. The main changes
occur in Section 1(f).
The first stage of the consumer's decision probtem is to decide on its total
consumption and saving, and therefore it has an intenemporal nature (see
Sectio i 1(b)). The second stage is concerned with how much to consume of
home goods, C~, and foreign goods, CA,. With Cobb-Douglas preferences,
consumers choose C~ and CA, to maximize the utility function
C-(C(,~rv)W(CA,~(1 - r.,))'-W subject to the static budget constraint PC„t
P' ECA, - C where E denotes the nominal exchange rate. This yields C„ - ~.,C
and CA, -(1 -or)C~v where the real exchange rate is defined as v~ P`E~P.
Upon substitution into the utility function, one obtains the consumrr price
index(CPI)asP~-P"(P'E)'-WsothatC~-r.,' WCandCA,-(I-~,)v-WC.
To keep matters simple, it is assumed that governmen[s have the same prrferen-
ces over home and foreign goods as the priva[e sector, so real government
spending on home goods is given by G„ ~ wG and that on foreign goods is
given by GA, -( l- m)G. Equation (24) is replaced by the condition for
eyuilibrium in the home goods market,
(39) Y-C„tG„tltC~,tG~,
-CfGfI fICAI}GA1-V(~,Al tGA1)],
and the condition for equilibrium in the foreign goods market,
l40) Y`-C~tG,',tI"fCA1fGA1
- C't G't I"t(CA, t GA, -(CM t Gn,)I v],
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where the terms ín square brackets denote the balances of trade. Similarly,
equation (25) describinQ the current-account dynamics is replaced by
(41) F-(r-n)F-~Y-C-G-1
-(r-rt)Ft[C,`,~fG,'~~-v(C,NtG„r)],
where F~( B- D) and F' -- F~ v. Real non-human wealth of home agents
is given by A - K f M t D f F and that of foreign agents is given by A' -
K' t M' f D' - F'. The condition for uncovered interest parity becomes
rfp-r'fp'te` or r-r`fv'~v.
The complete two-country model with imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods is particularly simple when the share of imported goods is
50 per cent (w - i), because then r- r' and therefore K- K', Y- Y' and
w- w'. Subtraction of (39) and ( 40) then yields v- l, so that P{, - P- P`E.
In other words, the special case m- i is observationally equivalent to the
purchasing power parity model discussed in Sections I-111. The general case
of r., ~ Z can be summarized by ten ordinary diHerentíal equations in terms of
K, K', F, v, U, U', M, M', D and D`, where the first three variables are
assumed to be predetermined and the remainder are assumed to be non-
predetermined.' Alternatively, one obtains a sub-system for the global averages
( K", U", M", D")', and an independent sub-system for the global difíerences,
( K'', F, v, U~, M`', D~ ) '. Table 1 shows that the eigenvalues associated with
the global averages for the tax-financed case are the same as under purchasing
power parity. This is not so for the global difterences; there are now two stable
eigenvalues associated with K`' and F and three unstable eigenvalues associ-
ated with v, U~ and M~. The global diHerence~ now adjust even more slowly;
that is, they take about 375 rather than 253 time-units to settle down within
0.1 per cent of the steady state.
Table 2 compares the efiects of tax-financed increases in monetary growth
under imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and under
purchasing power parity (PPP). The dynamic efíects of an increase in home
monetary growth are portrayed in Figures 1, 2 and 3. The main point to notice
is that with imperfect substitution the real exchange rate, v, misadjusts on
impact for a monetary expansion; it depreciates by 5-35 per cent on impact
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exp~nsion leads in the short run [o surpluses on the balance of trade and to
accumulation of net foreign assets, hence in the long run the economy can
afiord to finance a deficit on the balance of trade with the interest revenues
from abroad and to have a long-run appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Over the adjustment period the real exchange rate does and is expected to
appreciate, so that there is a real interest rate diHerential in favour of the home
country and thus the home capital stock exceeds the foreign capital stock.
Table 2 also shows that one of the main ef{ects of the volatility of the real
exchange rate under ímperfect substitution between home and forrign goods
is that there is less volatility in the other variables than there would be under
purchasing power parity. Joint changes in economic policy do not affect the
real exchange rate or the current account and thus yield the same outcomes
under purdiasing power parity as under imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods. Thrse outcomes are identical to the sum of the eHecu of
a unilateral increase in monetary growth on home outcomes plus the efiects
on 1'oreígn outcomes, so that they can be 'eye-balled' directly from Figures I,
2 and 3.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A two-country optimizing model with money, capital accumulation, floating
exchange rates, uncovered interest parity, perfect foresight, finite lives and
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population growth has been formulated. For the special case of a zero birth
rate, the discount rate used to calculate human wealth is the same as the
discounl rate used to calculate non-human wealth and government debt. It
follows that for this case individuals are indifierent between tax finance and
bond finance or money finance, so that Ricardian debt-neutrality and Sidrauski
super-neutrality hold. Note that these neutralities occur in economirs where
the probability of death equals the rate of population decline. Sufïicient
conditions for these neutralities are infinite lifetimes and no population growth
combined with the absence of an intergenerational bequest motive. The general
case of non-zero birth rates is best analysed by decomposing the system into
global averages and global diHerences. The main result of this paper is to
provide a micro foundation of the interdependent Mundell-Tobin eftect. This
means that a tax-financed increase in monetary growth (that is, when seig-
niorage is dístributed through helicopter drops of money) leads to a fall in
the world real interest rate and thus to an inerease in capital accumulation
and output throughout the world. A home monetary expansion leads in the
long run to an increase in home consumption, a fall in foreign consumption,
a home balance-of-trade deficit and an increase in home holdings of net foreign
assets. If the monetary expansion occurs through open-market operations (that
is, when money is distributed through governments purchasing bonds), money
is super-neutral. Hence a bond-financed increase in monetary growth leads to
a one-for-one increase in inflation and the nominal interest rate and has no
real eHects.
An interesting area for further research is the optimal determination of
fiscal policy (see Calvo and Obstfeld, 1988) and of monetary policy. This raises
the issue of how the welfare of difterent generations should be weighed in
order to construct a social welfare function. The problem of time inconsistency
arises because central banks have an incentive to levy a surpríse inflation tax.
Obviously, the problem of optimal economic policy needs to be considered
in an interdependent world and therefore issues of international policy coordi-
nation emerge. Most studies on international policy coordination have focused
on monetary disinflation in two-country, real-exchange-rate overshooting
modelc (e.g. Miller and Salmon, 1985; Currie and Levine, 1985; Oudiz and
Sachs, 1985; RogoH, 1985). However, such models imply ad huc welfare
functions and therefore do not permit a proper game-theoretic analysis of time
consistency and the merits of international policy coordination. In two-country
optimizing models of optimal taxation, one finds that in the absence of
international cooperation government spending is excessive (Kehoe, 1986,
1987; van der Ploeg, 1987) and monetary growth is too high (van der Ploeg,
1988a). Furthermore, internationa) policy coordination can aggravate the prob-
lems ofcredibility and time inconsistency so that cooperation between govern-
menls in the absence of pre-commitment uis-à-ois the private sector leads to
excessive monetary growth and inflation and can thus be counter-productive
(Rogoff, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988a). Obviously, it is interesting to investigate
the scope for international policy coordination within the context of the
particular two-country model developed in this paper. An ad hoc analysis
shows that, in the absence of international policy coordination, monetary
growth is too low (van der Ploeg, 1990). However, the paper shows that an
increase in home monetary growth may well be a beggar-thy-neighbour policy;
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for, despite the fact that capital increases, foreign consumption falls and
theretore, in the absencc of international policy coordination, there may well
be an inflationary bias in monetary growth.
APPENDIX
The world of super-neutrality and debt-neutrality discussed in Sectíon II is now
abandoned in favour of a world with strictly positive birth rates. This involves thc full
system ( 1)-(g). However, when the nonlinear system ( 1)-(g) is linearized around a
symmerríc steady state ( around B - B' and G- G'), it can be decoupled into a
sub-systcm for the global averages and another sub-system for the global diHerences
(cf. Aoki, 1981).
The statc-space vector of global averages is x" o(K", U", M", D")' and the instru-
ment vector of global averages ís u" i(B", G", ~o)', where a global average is defined
as the deviation of the arithmetic average of the home and foreign level from its
steady-state level (K" ~ K- K(oo) and, say U" ~}[ U- U(oo)] t}( U' - U'(oo)]). The
linearized sub-system for the global averages can then be written as
(AI) z"-
r-n -y 0 0
Uj"-(ntp)(at~) r-a -(ntp)(ot~) -(ntp)(ot~)
x"
A1j" -(1-y) rtB-n 0






- A"x" t B"u"
where ~- 1~(f,-I)70. The sub-system of global avrrages, ( Al), corresponds to the
dcscription of a closed world economy, and therefore issues such as current-account
dynamics do not fea[ure. The saddlepoint property ( e.g. F3uiter, 1984) of this perfect-
foresight sub-system requires two eigenvalues with negative real parts and two eigen-
values with positive real parts corresponding to two backward-looking ( predetermined)
variables K" and D", and two forward-looking ( jump) variables U" and M", respec-
tively. The product of the four eigenvalues associated with the sub-system of global
averages is
0" ~ det (AJ)
-{-(r-n)~7tt(n~-R)(ntP)[(r-n)(1 -y)B-yj"(BMt(rte-n)D)llf.
where the product of the three eigenvaluess associated with the sub-system for the case
of tax-finance ( f y 0, D" - 0) is given by
O~r ~ Y(rtB-n)UJ.,t(n t~)la tl~)IYMj"t(I -Y)[H-(w-Z)~M]).
Upon substitution of OTt into A", we have
0" - -f{y(r-n)(rt B-n)Uj"
t(ntp)(atQ)[yj"(rtB-n)(DtM)-(r-n)(1 -y)(w-Z)~A1]})0,
which is consistent with the saddlepoint property (given tha[ r- n~ 0 is assumed to
hold).`
Thr state-space vector of global ditierences is z~ ~( F, U~, M~, D~ )' and the instru-
ment vector of global diflerences is ua o(d~, G~, ~,~, ), where a global diHrrence is
defined as the arithmetic ditierence of the home and foreign level from its steady-state
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level (e.g. Ua i[U- U(oo)] -( U' - U'(m)]). The linearized sub-systern f~r the global
diffierences can then be written as
(A2)
r-n -}y 0 0
-2(nfQ)(~tQ) r-a -(ntQ)(trfQ) -(ntQ)(atQ) a
z
0 -(I-y) rt9-n 0
0 0 Bf -(r-n)~
0 -} 0
} 0 0 0 ua
Af 0 0
Mf -f f
- A"z" f B~u".
The sub-system ofglobal difterences, (A2), does not depend on global activity variables,
so that the current-account dynamics and the capital-stock dynamics are decoupled
and can be analysed separately. The saddlepoint property requires two eigenvalues
with negative real parts, associated with the predetermined variables F and D`', and
two eigenvalues with positive real parts, associated with the jump variables Ua and




where lhe product of the three eigenvalues associated with the sub-system for the case
of tax-finance is given by
DiF ~-(n tQ)(a tQ)(1 - y)(W -Z- BM)I M.
which is consistent with the saddlepoint property.
The comparative statics of the steady state makes use of dx"(oo)~du" --(A")-'B"
and dz~(co)~du~ --(Aa)-'Ba, so thal
(A3) dx(ao)Idu--}[(A")-~B'f(A')-~B']
(A4) dz'(~)Idu--}[(A")-~B'-(Ae)-~Ba].
These cxpressions for the steady-state multipliers can be evaluated analytically with








so that [dC(oo)~dB]TF a 0 and [dC'(oo) dB]TF- ~ 0. Similarly,
(A7) [dti1(m)IdeJTF




- -}M{yUj"tln tQ)(a fQ)[1- y-(W-Z)I UI(1-~"rFI~iF))IO"rF
3 -}MyUj",~TF-
as 0 iF ~ 0'TF s 0(and w Z Z f(rf B- n)M is assumed to hold).
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Although the comparative dynamics can, in principle, be evaluated analytically, it
is cumbersome, and thercfore dynamic adjustment paths for the endogenous variables
are e~aluated numerically. The transient perfect-foresight trajectories of the linearized
model are calculated with the aid of the computer program PSREM developed by
Markink and van der Ploeg (1988). It is easy to show that the impact effects on the
jump variables, for the global averages, are given by
Va
~A9) x~ (~) ~ M" - -NutAi t(NivNu)JB"u'.
where A, is a diagonal matrix with the two eigenvalues with positive real roots of A"
as its elements, (N,o ~ N„ ) is a matrix whose rows contain the row-eigenvectors associated
with the two eígenvalues in A„ and J is a matrix of zeroes and ones that permutes the
second and fourth row of B"u". A similar expression is used for the jumps in the global
diHerences.
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NOTES
1. When thr central banks care about output or consumption and inflation, one can show that,
in thc absence of international policy coordination, monetary growth and inflation are too low,
real intcrest rates are too high, and capital, output and employment arr too low. Since an
incrrase in monetary gruwth is a locomotive policy, each country attempts to transfer the
burden of reducing [he world real interest rate to the other countries as this leads to an increase
in activity without an increase in inflation ( van der Ploeg, 1990).
2. However, there are no rrsults on the eRects of money-financed increases in government sprnding
wi[hin two-country overlapping-generations models.
3. ~A'hen money yields no utility ( y z I), it corresponds to the unbacked and intrinsically uselrss
assct, fiat money, studied in the literature on money in overlapping-gcnerations models. A
monetary equilibrium then exists only when the rate of growth of the per capi[a money supply
is less than minus the pure rate of time preference (B c n- a ), and thus a positivr growth in
the nominal moncy supply can occur only when the non-monetary economy is dynamic,tlly
inrtlicient ( Wallace, 1980; Weil, 1989a, b).
4. This assumes that initially no gross foreign assets are held, so that jumps in the real exchange
rate do not Iead to jumps in F.
S. The founh eigenvalue is 0.
6. It is possible to examine undcr which conditions the saddlepoint propeny holds for the sprcial
case of tax finance. It will be assumed that wage income is suflicient to covrr lump-sum taxrs
plus the interest forgone on holding real money balances (í.e. w ~ Z-( r t B- n) A1), so tha[
~„ is negative. Hcnce the tax-hnance systrm has either one stable and two unstable eigenvalues
or thrre stable eigenvalues. Since the sum of the eigenvalues, r- n t r- a t r t y- n, is posi[ive
(as n ~ r s a t ~i t n is assumed to hold), the second possibility is ruled out and thercfore the
saddlcpoint propcny is satisficd.
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